INDEPENDENT JEWISH/PALESTINIAN THINK TANK

of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

LIVING DOCUMENT, January 2026

A quest for justice and balance, out of concern and heartache.

This Think Tank is neither a lobby organization nor an action group for either party. It exists for the benefit of both Israelis and Palestinians. We do not want to lose impartiality and integrity.

The content of this Living Document reflects predominantly factual information derived from public sources that can be retrieved on first demand. We disclose the views of the Think Tank where we deem this desirable. Such statements do not always represent unanimity, as all matters are open for discussion within the Think Tank. The guiding principle is concern for both Israelis and Palestinians, which does not include terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, nor violent Jewish settlers.

Our mission:

1. Facilitate dialogues between Dutch and Palestinian politicians and between Dutch and Israeli parliamentarians based on the Netherlands' historical relationship with both parties and policy areas in which various Dutch parties find common ground. This could be complementary to the existing contacts on the Dutch governmental level. Five Dutch parliamentarians from five political parties participate in the dialogues. A first dialogue with Palestinian politicians has taken place. The ultimate goal is a tripartite consultation to discuss the path for peaceful coexistence.
2. Filter reliable information about the conflict between Israël and the Palestinians and present it via this Living Document (LD) for Dutch parliamentarians who participate in this 'Parliamentarians to Parliamentarians Initiative'.

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

Table of Contents

1. Clashing narrative of an existential conflict

2. Jews and Palestinians

3. Occupation and annexation

4. Observations on the West Bank

4.1. The Israeli side
4.2. The Palestinian side

5. Observations on Gaza

5.1. The October 7th Attacks
5.2. The Destruction of Gaza

6. The threat to Israel's democratic identity

7. Immediate propositions and long-term solutions

7.1. One-state solution
7.2. Two-state solution

8. Effects on local communities

8.1. Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement

9. The geopolitical perspective

10. United Nations and UNRWA

11. United States of America

12. European Union

13. The Netherlands

"Success is not final. Failure is not fatal.
It is the courage to continue that counts".

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

1. Clashing narratives of an existential conflict

Israelis and Palestinians have been in conflict for a century, even before they were known by these identities. The history of the conflict, the mutual exclusion of each other's narratives, and their relationship with Jewish and Arabic cultures all require consideration. Empathy for the historical narratives of the parties is important and something to be mindful of as we acknowledge the responsibility of both sides to avoid violence. However, as suffering and violence are ongoing, this document is forward-looking. It provides brief historical notes only when necessary to understand the current moment.

Amidst the 1947-1949 clashes between Zionist Jews and Palestinian Arabs (backed by multiple Arab states), the State of Israel was established, and the Palestinians were scattered in various areas. Since then, several anomalies have emerged. Israel remains unrecognized by several of its neighbors and its very existence is challenged by state and non-state actors. The Palestinians are under constant military occupation, have no citizenship, and are one of the largest groups of stateless refugees in the world. For almost 80 consecutive years, Israel has been fighting for its security and to be accepted in the region, while Palestinians have been fighting for their basic human rights.

2. Jews and Palestinians

There are about 15-17 million Jews and 12-15 million Palestinians in the world. About 45% of the world's Jewry (just over 7.5 million) live in Israel, which defines itself as a Jewish and democratic state. Israel provides birth rights for every Jew to become a citizen and until recently been generally understood to be a democracy within its internationally recognized borders. However, several members of our Think Tank oppose the designation of a Jewish State, for its pretentiousness to represent the entire Jewish people and for its discrimination against Israelis who are not Jewish.

The Palestinians are scattered in various civil statuses and living conditions. Around 5 million live in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, half of whom are considered 1948 refugees. An additional 3-3.5 million Palestinian refugees live in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. There are also more than 2 million Palestinian descendants who live within Israel, hold an Israeli passport, and are citizens of Israel. An additional 350-400,000 Palestinians live in East Jerusalem (35-40% of the city's population). Their status is of permanent residency with a de jure path to citizenship, but Israeli authorities deter their application, and de facto more than 90% remain without citizenship with many maintaining a Jordanian passport. In the wider diaspora, there are at least 2 million Palestinians, the biggest centers are in the Arabic Gulf, Chile, and the USA. Many of them hold local passports while continuing to be considered 1948 refugees.

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

3. Occupation and annexation

During the 1967 Six-Day War with Arab States, Israel seized the Gaza Strip, the Golan, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Sinai Peninsula. It has since withdrawn from the Sinai in exchange for a full peace agreement with Egypt in 1979. Jordan waived its claim for the West Bank in 1988 and paved the way for a full peace agreement with Israel in 1994. These developments severed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the broader Arab Israeli conflict and limited Israel's existential threat to Iranian-backed proxies.

At the same time, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and the Golan and enforced a longstanding military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. In the 1990s the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) gained quasi-autonomous authority over a small portion of the West Bank in exchange for de facto recognition of Israel. However, Israel maintained full authority over most of the West Bank and continuously expanded its civic presence by building illegal settlements.

In 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advised that Israel's occupation of the West Bank is illegal. It advocated that Israel would evacuate all settlers and compensate Palestinians and called for all third parties to refrain from complacency. However, Israel's control over the West Bank has received unequivocal support from the current American administration which had previously expressed willingness to recognize an official Israeli annexation.

We believe that the occupation will continue to fail to bring Israel security, while costing many lives on both sides, without an end in sight.

4. Observations on the West Bank

Between 1991 and 2014, Israelis and Palestinians were engaged in bilateral negotiations and signed interim agreements (the Oslo Accords) that govern the facts on the ground in the West Bank. They established mutual Israeli-PLO recognition, in which both sides declared a preference for diplomacy over violence. They created the Palestinian Authority (PA), divided the West Bank into ABC territories, outlined the order of Israeli pullout, and established a Palestinian police force that cooperates with Israeli intelligence services. The Oslo Accords tailored the entire status quo of the last 30 years, for which they are disliked by all sides. However, they also allowed the PLO to receive widespread international recognition, and 85-90% of the Palestinians in the West Bank to be governed by autonomous bodies operating under their national symbols. From the Israeli side, the Oslo Accords have assisted Israel to maintain its democratic identity and Jewish majority, avoid international sanctions, and avoid direct responsibility over the Palestinian people. So, while the Oslo Accords are regularly pronounced dead, they continue to shape the actions of all sides.

4.1. The Israeli side

- Following the Oslo Accords, Israel fully controls 60% of the West Bank (Area C).[1] This area was supposed to be part of a future Palestinian state. However, over the years, Israel has entrenched its hold by settlement expansion, designation of land as military zones, de facto expropriation of

[1] Israel has additional military control over 22%, where the Palestinian Authority has administrative presence (Area B). The other 18% (Area A), which includes Palestinian cities, is under Palestinian civil and security control. However, since 2020, the Israeli military has increasingly been raiding those areas as well.

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

Palestinian property, and growing limitations on Palestinians who wish to move or work in them.

- As of 2025, some 500,000 Jewish settlers lived in 141 government-authorized settlements, widely considered illegal under international law, and in 224 outposts illegal even under Israeli law. In 2025, Israel approved the establishment of 41 new settlements, including in the consequential E1 route, marking the biggest settlement expansion in decades.
- Area C runs between multiple small enclosures of Areas A+B. Therefore, Israel controls the movement of Palestinians between their cities and villages, as well as the entry and exit of resources from them.
- Israel exercises military law in Area C, which includes draconian tools such as detention without a trial. In 2025, thousands of Palestinians, including dozens of minors, were detained for weeks and months without a trial.
- Israel effectively controls the water distribution in the West Bank and discriminates between Israeli settlers and Palestinians.
- As per the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian banking system is also dependent on Israel. In 2025, Israeli Finance Minister Smotrich repeatedly threatened to end 30-year cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian banks in a move that would cut them from the global banking system and place the Palestinian economy on the brink of collapse.
- Settler Violence: Settlers had captured up to 14% of the West Bank and forced Palestinians to abandon their land. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded over 1,500 settler-related attacks in 2025, including over 250 in October 2025 alone, resulting in Palestinian casualties, property damage or both.

4.2. The Palestinian Side

- In the areas under Palestinian control, the official administration is that of the PA, governed by the PLO and its President, Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah Party. In 2025, Fatah appointed Hussein al-Sheikh to be the Secretary General of the PLO.
- Support of violence within the PLO is institutionalized. Fatah's symbol remains guns and grenades over Israel/Palestine. In 2021, the EU's review of textbooks in the PA's administered schools found they teach children to hate, use violence and glorify Islamic martyrdom. For years, the PA has been regularly paying monthly allowances to relatives of Hamas terrorists as part of its social welfare system. By the end of 2025, the PA had begun reforming that policy.
- The PLO is accused of widespread corruption, authoritarian rule, and lack of internal legitimacy. Its President's equity has an estimated net worth of over 100 million dollars. The Palestinians have not held elections for almost two decades.
- As the PA is unpopular and seems to be on the brink of losing control, militant groups are growing in the West Bank. Some are Islamist and affiliated with Hamas.

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

5. Observations on Gaza

Following the Oslo Accords, Gaza was the second area (after Jericho) to be transferred from Israel to Palestinian control. Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2006 unilaterally, without a formal agreement with the PLO. Subsequently, in the only general elections held in Gaza, Hamas got a slim non-absolute majority (44% to Fatah's 41%) and went on to banish the PA and grasp full control over the Strip. Israel's response was an immediate blockade. At least since 2012, Israel has been encouraging the rift between Hamas and the PLO by allowing Hamas to receive regular funding from Qatar. Hamas has been running a closed authoritarian regime in Gaza through religious laws and suppressing dissent. The principle of armed resistance against Israeli occupation manifested itself in regular rocket firing from Gaza to Israel. Between 2006 and 2022, Israel and Hamas initiated several rounds of fighting, during which around 4,500 Palestinians in Gaza and 120 Israelis died.

5.1. The October 7th Attacks

On October 7, 2023, thousands of Hamas terrorists and Gazans civilians broke down the fence between Gaza and Israel, killing approximately 1200 Israelis and others, most of them civilians, including children and the elderly. After these atrocities, which included rape and torture, they took approximately 250 innocent hostages. Hamas and smaller groups that operate in Gaza are declared terrorist organizations by the EU and aligned with Iran's axis, which includes Houthis from Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The Hamas-Israel wars have failed to liberate an inch of Palestinian land or advance Palestinian rights and instead have risked tens of thousands of Gazans being killed. For the sake of the Palestinian people in Gaza, who are suffering dearly from this war, and the population of Israel, Hamas would need to be neutralized. However the ideology of Hamas proves hard to crack, with a large number of Palestinians supporting its October 7 attacks as resistance to Israeli occupation.

5.2. The destruction of Gaza

Israel's response to the October 7th attack was an aerial bombardment on a scale rarely seen before, followed by an ongoing ground incursion. While Israel did not manage to end Hamas' reign nor free more than a handful of hostages through aggressive military means, it did destroy most of Gaza's infrastructure. Tens of thousands have been killed. Hamas's Health Ministry claimed more than 70,000 Gazan fatalities and named more than 60,000 (December, 2025). The number of fatalities is disproportionate and indiscriminate. Thousands of children under 12 have perished. Survivors suffer from malnutrition, a lack of medical and mental health care, and clean water.

The Israeli army (IDF) is accused of war crimes. Israeli politicians openly called for war crimes to be committed. IDF commanders were documented ordering arbitrary killings. The scale of such acts is unknown, as Israel prevents foreign press from entering Gaza. Nevertheless, reports show an intentional destruction of water resources. Israel had also blocked the operations of multiple aid organizations. The fluctuating entry of humanitarian aid led to the spread of disease and famine.

The International Court of Justice in The Hague had warned Israel of the risk of genocide and detailed other parties' obligation to prevent it. Multiple human rights

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

organizations, including Israeli ones, accused Israel of genocidal acts. Many Western countries, including the Netherlands, warned Israel of the humanitarian consequences and are trying to convince the Israeli Government to cease fire and prevent famine, which is an obligation under international law.

In 2024, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court called for the arrest of Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, his former Minister of Defense. The Court had previously (in 2021) concluded it has the authority to investigate war crimes in the West Bank and Gaza. In 2025, the incoming American administration retaliated with personal sanctions against the Chief ICC prosecutor, as well as several of its judges.

6. The threat to Israel's democratic identity

Israel's actions in Gaza and the West Bank are closely linked to the political vision of its present government, which favours conflict over compromise. This represents a moral decline risking Israel's soul and alienates large parts of the Jewish diaspora

While general elections in Israel are due in 2026, democratic backsliding processes might affect their fairness. The current Israeli government has been systematically attacking every institution that is meant to check its power, including the Israeli High Court, the media, and civil society organizations. The longstanding Israeli PM, Benjamin Netanyahu, faces corruption charges for attempting to control Israel's media landscape.

In 2025, Netanyahu was formally accused by the head of Israel's internal secret services (the Shin Bet) of using the Gaza war to postpone his trial. The government had fired the aforementioned head of the Shin Bet in a controversial process and initiated a move to also replace Israel's Attorney General, who is responsible for prosecuting Netanyahu. Since July 2025, the US President has also been lobbying for the cancellation of Netanyahu's trial and publicly called Israel's President to pardon him. Netanyahu filed an official request to cancel his trial, pending the review of the Israeli President.

7. Immediate propositions and long-term possible solutions

<u>We believe the violent conflict will not end without a top-down intervention, a new democratically elected Israeli Government, PA reforms, and the complete disarmament of Hamas.</u>

Frustratingly, for the first 16 months of the war neither the EU, the Arab League, Israel, the PLO, nor the US had detailed a coherent, comprehensive plan for the future of Gaza. Only in March 2025, after the Trump Administration publicly advocated for the transfer of millions of Palestinians outside of Gaza, the Arab League endorsed a plan that reportedly calls for the international community to invest $53 billion in Gaza over five years. In late September, the American administration posted its 20-Point Plan to have Hamas removed from power and Israel withdrawn from Gaza. Its first phase was signed by the parties in October and produced a fragile ceasefire status quo, a comprehensive hostage exchange deal, partial Israeli withdrawal, and an increase in aid entering the Strip.

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

The 20-Point Plan aims to create a temporary technocratic Palestinian government to run Gaza, an international stabilization force (ISF) to maintain order, and an international Board of Peace, chaired by the US President, to oversee the initiative. In November 2025, the Plan became an official international convention as the appendix to a UNSC resolution 2803.

The 20-Point Plan refers to the Trump administration's 2020 Peace Plan between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as a 2025 French Saudi two-state solution initiative, as benchmarks for reforms needed for the PA to rule Gaza in the future. Much like the Arab League's plan for Gaza, these previous plans are geared towards resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calling Israelis and Palestinians to agree on a complete cessation of hostilities and move towards a two-state solution.

Here is a brief input on the one-state/two-state schemes:[2]

7.1. One-State Solution

A true one-state solution implies equal status for the two peoples living in that state. But those who propose such a destination do so as a general framework only. A one-state with equal rights for all looks reasonable, but the two peoples share little and have legitimate national aspirations to govern their own affairs. As the one-state solution goes against the international consensus and might not be possible for cultural, economic, historical and demographic reasons, neither Israeli nor Palestinian politicians are currently proposing it, and it has never gained substantial support in any demographic group living in the area.

7.2. Two-State Solution

The Two-State proposition has been the default solution for the conflict for almost a century. It was adjusted and detailed during the 1990s bilateral peace negotiations and saw three concrete propositions for application: the 2001 Taba Summit, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and the 2007 Annapolis Conference negotiations. In principle, the entire world, including all Arab countries, the PA, and previous Israeli governments expressed support for this solution.

A majority in our Think Tank favours the Two-State Solution. We believe that the Arab Peace Initiative, which was re-endorsed in 2007 and 2013, could be instrumental in ending the conflict. The proposal for Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied since 1967 with the option of mutually agreed territorial swaps and the establishment of a Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital. It would mean a homeland for either party and an end to the conflict.

But as more than a decade has passed since bilateral negotiations stopped (in 2014), both Israel and the PA received backing for unilateral actions. Israel's creeping annexation has the full support of the current US Administration whereas a growing number of European states have unilaterally recognized the State of Palestine, joining more than 140 states that have previously done so.

In an era of unilateralism, trust-building steps are ever more necessary. At times during the peace negotiations, between 1991-2014, public support for the two-state solution gained a majority from both peoples. Today, most polls generally

[2] Confederation ideas that involve Israel, Palestine, and perhaps other states are generally addenda to two-state propositions whereas federative initiatives are part of a one-state solution, as they eventually envision a unitary entity that will be sovereign between the River and the Sea.

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

show pessimism and support for violence. This confirms a growing mental strain on Israelis and Palestinians from the ongoing conflict and war. However, polls also show that support for a peaceful resolution grows when accompanied by trust-building steps.

Trust-building steps can be conceived as short-term successful agreements that show the seriousness and goodwill of both sides. For example, a declarative reaffirmation by both sides as to the agreements they signed in the 1990s. A symbolic dismantling of illegal Israeli outposts in exchange for symbolic changes to Fatah's flag.

Other trust-building steps can come from the bottom up. For example, through organizations such as the Israeli "Women Wage Peace" and Palestinian "Women of the Sun", who were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2024 and 2025. In 2025, Palestinian American Ahmed Alkhatib initiated "Realign for Palestine" supporting moderate voices for peace.

Trust-building steps can also be initiated by the political elite. For example, in 2021-2022, Israel's Defence Minister hosted the Palestinian President in his home to establish closer relations. In 2023, former Israeli PM, Ehud Olmert, and PA's former Foreign Affairs minister, Nasser Al-Kidwa, suggested that a deal to end the war in Gaza could materialize into a full two-state solution and regional peace.

In late 2024, Israel's Leader of the Opposition, centrist Yair Lapid, voiced support for a regional Middle East peace deal that would include a path for a Palestinian State. The Israeli left currently runs as the "The Democrats" under the leadership of Yair Golan, who also favours a two-state solution. The opposition in Israel includes centre-right, centre-left, and Arab parties who collaborated in a previous coalition government that now has an absolute majority in most hypothetical election polls.

On the Palestinian side, the only established alternative to Hamas in Gaza remains the PA. While President Abbas avoided condemning the October 7th attacks until June 2025, he reportedly did so by calling on Hamas to give up its rule over Gaza. Abbas' statements come in response to the French Saudi Two-State Solution initiative, which included the recognition of a Palestinian state by several countries and the PA's commitment to government reform.

8. Effects on local communities

During this war, anti-Israel incidents in the Netherlands increased by circa 800%. Dutch Jews have been affected. Statues commemorating the Jewish Holocaust were desecrated. In November 2024, when Israeli football fans and pro-Palestinian Dutch demonstrators clashed in Amsterdam, local Dutch Jews were chased in the streets. Islamophobia and other forms of xenophobia against local Dutch communities have also been on the rise.

With regards to the protests across Europe, and in the Netherlands as well, one should distinguish between calls for a ceasefire and calls against Jewish Israelis. We refer to Ahmed Alkhatib, who lost 31 members of his family in the war but criticized some pro-Palestinian demonstrations for "repeating Hamas rhetoric". On the other side, some Christian organizations advocate and support some of the most extreme Jewish forces in the West Bank. As of 2025, settlers have been receiving support from 'Christians for Israel Netherlands'. It means support for the occupation of the Palestinians.

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

8.1. Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement

In 2025, multiple Dutch Universities had begun cutting institutional programs with Israeli universities. The Think Tank believes that such boycotts will not be effective in advancing justice and peace for Palestinians and Israelis. It also obscures the distinction between Israel and the territories it occupied since 1967. The EU opposes a boycott of Israel, and so does the Dutch Government. So, while BDS against the occupation is not anti-Semitic, the BDS of Israeli universities is counterproductive, for they are a bastion of dissenting voices, including Arab Palestinian students, who can criticize the government and do so freely. As Dutch universities are failing to resist boycotting their Israeli counterparts, they feed into trends of polarization.

9. The geopolitical perspective

The Israeli Palestinian conflict is increasingly entangled in the tectonic shifts of the Middle East, given the civil wars in Yemen and Syria, and the recent direct war between Israel and Iran, which also involved direct strikes by the USA. Iranian allies from Yemen (the Houthis) and Lebanon (Hezbollah) had attacked Israel since October 8th 2023. Israel invaded Lebanon and killed Hezbollah's leaders, indirectly assisting Syrian rebels to topple the Assad regime. Israel and Hezbollah are currently in a fragile ceasefire. While Hezbollah remains armed in Southern Lebanon, Israel occupies parts of the country as well as high viewpoints in the Syrian mountains beyond the occupied Golan Heights. Israel has also been striking in Yemen as a response to Houthi attacks, and in Syria, with a July 2025 hit on major government buildings in Damascus, intervening in internal clashes between Druze and Bedouin communities in Syria.

Nowadays, many in the Sunni Muslim world see Iran, a Shia Muslim theocracy, as a destabilizing force in the Middle East. When it directly attacked Israel, it was the uncommon coalition of Western powers, Jordan, and even the Saudis who indirectly helped Israel defend itself. This did not materialize into a formal alliance to continue advancing normalization agreements between Israel and Arab nations. The previous agreements, signed in 2020 as the Abraham Accords, established relations between Israel and multiple Arab states and delayed the Israeli government's plans to officially annex the West Bank.

The Arab world has long been in favour of a Palestinian state, willing to negotiate with Israel about the conditions for its establishment. Jordan’s Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, said on October 2, 2024 at a press conference: ”We are members of the Muslim Arab Committee, mandated by 57 Arab and Muslim countries, and I can tell you unequivocally that all of us are willing, right now, to guarantee the security of Israel in the context of ending the occupation and allowing for the emergence of a Palestinian State”. The 2025 Arab League proposal for Gaza and its support for the 20-Point Plan (see section 7) built on that longstanding position.

10. The United Nations and UNRWA

With regard to UN bodies, they have either been paralyzed or accused of bias by both sides. On one hand, the veto rights within the UN Security Council meant that until UNSC 2803, only declarative resolutions were passed about Gaza. On the other hand, even before the war UN bodies such as the General Assembly voted to condemn and censure Israel more times than all other countries in the world combined, thereby damaging its own credibility. Better than adding even

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

more condemnations, the UN would rather focus on the implementation and enforcement of UNSC resolutions.

Another key UN body concerning the conflict is its Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which takes responsibility for humanitarian support and education and monitors the situation of Palestinian refugees. Established in 1949 as a temporary agency, UNRWA administers a unique refugee status for Palestinians that is inherited across generations until a political solution is reached. Regularly, about 33% of its estimated 1.5 billion dollar budget is directed to provide relief in Jordan, Syria or Lebanon, where many Palestinian refugees fled and are forced to live with minimal integration. In Gaza, UNRWA became, after Hamas, the second biggest employer, as 13,000 of its workers had received 80 million dollars each month, more than 50% of the organization's entire estimated budget.

UNRWA is completely dependent on national donations, and at constant risk of being unable to honor its commitments. Its biggest single donor has been the US, holding around 30% of its funding, while EU countries are responsible for about another 35%.

UNRWA could become instrumental in turning refugee camps into prosperous communities with the support of the UN, the US, the EU and Israel. However, as several of its members were fired in mid-2024 over alleged involvement in violent acts orchestrated by Hamas, its future is uncertain. Israel banned its work entirely, even as it remains essential and irreplaceable for the daily lives of Palestinians. Many other countries, including the Netherlands, had reduced their contribution in 2024, and questioned their future support for the organization.

11. United States of America

For decades, the US expressed opposition to Israel's settlement growth in the West Bank and Jerusalem as it impeded the likelihood of the two-state solution. The US had shown 50 years of bipartisan support for a two-state solution aligned with the international community. The Trump Administration showed signs of changing this US convention, by supporting the present Israeli government's one-state policies. In 2019, the US stated that Israeli settlements may be consistent with international law. In 2020, the Trump Plan included the annexation of 30% of the West Bank to Israel. In 2025, the Trump Administration's 20 Point Plan referred to that plan as criteria for the PA to be able to govern Gaza.

American Evangelicals play a significant role in developing Israel’s illegal presence on the West Bank. Religious motives in terms of the Biblical notion of the Promised Land, the Chosen People, and the Second Coming of Christ are dominant. The Trump appointed American Ambassador to Israel is a former Evangelical pastor who stated, "There is no such thing as a Palestinian”. We, as a Think Tank, dismiss political notions based on certain interpretations of the Bible.

12. The European Union

The EU is Israel's biggest trading partner and the biggest donor to the Palestinians. Its economic and diplomatic power should not be underestimated. The European Parliament maintains steadfast support for the Two-State solution "on the basis of the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states, with security for the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian State living

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

side by side in peace on the basis of self-determination and respect of international law".

The EU conditioned its relationship with both Israel and the Palestinians on their stated intentions to resolve the conflict. It imposed import labeling on products from Israeli settlements and blocked closer ties between Israel and Europol for concerns about Israel's control over the West Bank. Its budgetary committee had previously made support for the PA contingent on modifying their EU-financed school textbooks. On the other hand, the EU also promised Israel and the PA 'a special privileged partnership', that would give them increased access to European markets etc., if both parties reach a peace agreement.

In general, each EU member is sovereign and has set independent policies. For example, EU states' responses to the ICC's arrest warrants of Israeli leaders ranged from complete adherence by some EU countries to the Hungarian government inviting Netanyahu to visit Hungary in explicit defiance of the warrant. In September 2025, the EU proposed introducing travel bans and asset freezes of two members of the Israeli cabinet, Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, and reviewing the EU's economic and research partnership with Israel over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Following the October 2025 ceasefire status quo, this proposition had been temporarily tabled.

13. The Netherlands

The Netherlands, as does the EU, considers Israeli settlements in the occupied territories as conflicting with international law and an obstacle to peace. The Dutch policies concerning Gaza are fluctuating. The Dutch government backed the ICC's persecution of the Israeli PM and had independently issued travel bans against the same two Israeli ministers.

Until recently, the Netherlands was the 7th largest single contributor to UNRWA, responsible for about 4% of all contributions. It is also Israel's 6-7th largest single importer/exporter, responsible for about 4-5% of Israel's imports and exports worldwide.

In 2025, Dutch civic society expressed frustration with the government's inaction on Israel, with some of the largest demonstrations in decades. However, in the Dutch parliament, a motion to enforce a full temporary arms embargo - including defensive systems - against Israel was rejected by a large majority. The Netherlands can still be considered a balanced political entity that has both parties' best interests at heart and good, longstanding relations with them. As such, it can have a bigger role in advancing positive dialogues that might lead to change in the region.

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk

Independent Jewish/Palestinian Think Tank

Het Spijk 3, 1274 AV Huizen, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31654925455 Mail: info@independentjewishpalestinianthinktank.org

Website: http://www.independentjewishpalestinianthinktank.org

Chamber of Commerce: 5925468 Bankacc: NL35 INGB 0008 3043 36

Members

Volkert de Buisonjé (Khalilieh) *Senior Software Developer*

Eric Bremer, *public administration & entrepreneur,* Treasurer

Mateo I. Cohen, MSc, *political scientist, editor Living Document*

Maurits Cohen*, co-editor Living Document*

Pieter B. van Daalen, LLM, *Interim manager,* Executive Secretary

Prof. dr. Sven Danner, *Internal medicine*

Yvonne Walvisch, LLM, *Director adult education*

Hans Ph. Weijel, MSc, *political scientist & public affairs,* Chairman

International Advisory Council

Prof. dr. Danny D. Brom, *clinical psychologist & director, METIV, The Israel Psychotrauma Center*

René Giel, *Director Kontakt der Kontinenten, Netherlands*

Dr. Ariel de Graaf, *physicist, Israel*

Prof. dr. Menachem Klein, *political scientist, Israel*

Prof. dr. Steven Klein, *conflict management & negotiation, Israel*

Prof. Mohammed Shaheen, *Public Health, Al-Quds University, Palestinian Territories*

Esther Struikmans, MA, *Theologian and Arabist*, *Netherlands*.

Disclaimer: This document was prepared by the independent Jewish/Palestinian Think Tank (the "Foundation"). Although the information in this document has been obtained from sources which the Foundation believes to be reliable, the Foundation does not represent or warrant, expressly or implied, its accuracy or completeness, and such information may be condensed. No responsibility is or will be accepted by the Foundation or its respective directors, officers, partners, or advisers, as to the accuracy and completeness of the information contained in this document and nothing in this document shall be deemed to constitute such a warranty. This document may be subject to variation to the extent that any assumptions contained herein prove to be incorrect. This document is provided for discussion purposes only and the information in this document reflects currently prevailing conditions and views, which are subject to change. Opinions may be changed without notice. The Foundation assumes no obligation to notify or inform the recipient of any developments or changes occurring after the date of this document that might render its contents untrue or inaccurate in whole or in part. The information contained herein may not be reproduced or redistributed (in whole or in part) in any format without the express written approval of the Foundation.

Classified as | Confidential - Vertrouwelijk